Financial incentives and health provider behaviour: Evidence from a capitation policy in Ghana.

The capitation payment model has been used as a supply-side cost-containment tool in controlling physician behaviour. However, little is known regarding its effectiveness in controlling costs and discouraging use of low-value care. This study seeks to examine whether financial incentives in capitation influence provider behaviour, and if so, whether such behaviour compromises outcomes for inpatients with hypertension. To this end, we evaluate the effect on outpatient visits and inpatient outcomes of the introduction of capitation into a mixed payment system involving diagnosis-related groups and fee-for-service in the Ashanti region of Ghana. We use difference-in-differences with fixed effects and event study analysis of claims data over 48 months (2016-2019). We found that providers responded to financial incentives in capitation; outpatient visits were approximately 35% lower. However, we found no significant impact of capitation on inpatient outcomes; that is, the in-hospital death rate did not increase, and the length of hospital stay (which may be a rough indicator of the severity of illness) also did not increase. These findings indicate that patient health outcomes did not deteriorate. Evidence suggests that the observed reduction in outpatient visits may be in unnecessary or low-value visits, especially at lower levels of the healthcare system.

The effect of internal salary incentives based on insurance payment on physicians' behavior: experimental evidence.

BACKGROUND: Understanding how physicians respond to payment methods is crucial for designing effective incentives and enhancing the insurance system. Previous theoretical research has explored the effects of payment methods on physician behavior based on a two-level incentive path; however, empirical evidence to validate these theoretical frameworks is lacking. To address this research gap, we conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate physicians' behavioral responses to three types of internal salary incentives based on diagnosis-related-group (DRG) and fee-for-service (FFS). METHODS: A total of 150 medical students from Capital Medical University were recruited as participants. These subjects played the role of physicians in choosing the quantity of medical services for nine types of patients under three types of salary incentives-fixed wage, constant fixed wage with variable performance wage, and variable fixed wage with variable performance wage, of which performance wage referred to the payment method balance under FFS or DRG. We collected data on the quantities of medical services provided by the participants and analyzed the results using the Friedman test and the fixed effects model. RESULTS: The results showed that a fixed wage level did not have a significant impact on physicians' behavior. However, the patients benefited more under the fixed wage compared to other salary incentives. In the case of a floating wage system, which consisted of a constant fixed wage and a variable performance wage from the payment method balance, an increase in performance wage led to a decrease in physicians' service provision under DRG but an increase under FFS. Consequently, this resulted in a decrease in patient benefit. When the salary level remained constant, but the composition of the salary varied, physicians' behavior changed slightly under FFS but not significantly under DRG. Additionally, patient benefits decreased as the ratio of performance wages increased under FFS. CONCLUSIONS: While using payment method balance as physicians' salary may be effective in transferring incentives of payment methods to physicians through internal compensation frameworks, it should be used with caution, particularly when the measurement standard of care is imperfect.

Increasing capitation in mixed remuneration schemes: Effects on service provision and process quality of care.

Many health systems apply mixed remuneration schemes for general practitioners, but little is known about the effects on service provision of changing the relative mix of fee for services and capitation. We apply difference-in-differences analyses to evaluate a reform that effectively reversed the mix between fee for services and capitation from 80/20 to 20/80 for patients with type 2 diabetes. Our results show reductions in provision of both the contact services that became capitated and in other non-capitated (still-billable) services. Reduced provision also occurred for guideline-recommended process quality services. We find that the effects are mainly driven by patients with co-morbidities and by general practitioners with high income, relatively many diabetes patients, and solo practitioners. Thus, increasing capitation in a mixed remuneration schemes appears to reduce service provision for patients with type 2 diabetes monitored in general practice with a risk of unwanted quality effects.

[Summary Community Health Centers in Belgium: thinking health out of the box]. / Les maisons médicales en Belgique : la santé dans tous ses états.

The federation of community health centersa includes 130 practices in French-speaking Belgium. They are organized as self-managed practices, which enables a certain equality between the workers in the team in terms of shared decision. Moreover, these care structures are organized as multidisciplinary teams and most of the time choose a capitation-fee payment for their services. This method of remuneration makes it possible to increase proactivity and improve prevention and health promotion, which are at the heart of the challenges for primary care. The center in Trooz illustrates this organization around the concept of community health. The active participation of patients in the project is at the center of the concerns to achieve patient-centered care.

La Fédération des maisons médicales (FMM) regroupe 130 pratiques en Belgique francophone. Elles sont organisées en autogestion, ce qui confère une certaine égalité entre les travailleurs de l'équipe quant aux décisions prises. Par ailleurs, ces structures de soins sont organisées en pratique multidisciplinaire et optent, la plupart du temps, pour un paiement forfaitaire de leurs prestations. Ce mode de rémunération permet d'augmenter la proactivité et d'améliorer la prévention et la promotion à la santé qui sont au cœur des défis de la première ligne. La maison médicale de Trooz illustre cette organisation autour du concept central de la santé communautaire. La participation active des patients dans le projet est au cœur des préoccupations pour réaliser une réelle approche centrée sur leurs besoins.

Relational Continuity, Physician Payment, and Team-Based Primary Care in the Canadian Health Care System.

PURPOSE: Continuity is a core component of primary care and known to differ by patient characteristics. It is unclear how primary care physician payment and organization are associated with continuity. METHODS: We analyzed administrative data from 7,110,036 individuals aged 16+ in Ontario, Canada who were enrolled to a physician and made at least 2 visits between October 1, 2017 and September 30, 2019. Continuity with physician and practice group was quantified using the usual provider of care index. We used log-binomial regression to assess the relationship between enrollment model and continuity adjusting for patient characteristics. RESULTS: Mean physician and group continuity were 67.3% and 73.8%, respectively, for patients enrolled in enhanced fee-for-service, 70.7% and 76.2% for nonteam capitation, and 70.6% and 78.7% for team-based capitation. These differences were attenuated in regression models for physician-level continuity and group-level continuity. Older age was the most notable factor associated with continuity. Compared with those 16 to 34, those 80 and older had 1.45 times higher continuity with their physician. CONCLUSION: Our results suggest that continuity does not differ substantially by physician payment or organizational model among primary care patients who are formally enrolled with a physician in a setting with universal health insurance.

How to Pay for Telemedicine: A Comparison of Ten Health Systems.

Telemedicine has the opportunity to improve clinical effectiveness, health care access, cost-savings, and patient care. However, payment systems may form important obstacles to optimally use telemedicine and enable its opportunities. Little is known about payment systems for telemedicine. Therefore, this research aims to increase knowledge on paying for telemedicine by comparing payment systems for telemedicine and identifying similarities and differences. Based on the countries' official physician fee schedules, listing all reimbursed medical services performed by physicians, a comparative analysis of telemedicine payment systems in ten countries was conducted. Findings show that many countries lacked tele-expertise and telemonitoring payment, with the exception for some specific payments such as for telemonitoring in patients with cardiac implantable electronic devices. Moreover, a wide variety of benefit specifications were implemented in all countries to specify which type of clinician contact should be used (remote versus physical) in which circumstances. Payment parity between video and in-person visits was established only in a few countries. Furthermore, fee-for-service was the dominant payment system, although two countries used a capitation-based or hybrid system. The results imply several potential payment challenges when implementing telemedicine: complex benefit specifications, payment parity discussions, and risk of overconsumption due to the dominant fee-for-service system. These challenges appear to be less present in capitation-based or hybrid systems. However, the latter needs to be further explored to harness the full potential of telemedicine.

How the Gender Wage Gap for Primary Care Physicians Differs by Compensation Approach : A Microsimulation Study.

BACKGROUND: The physician gender wage gap may be due, in part, to productivity-based compensation models that undervalue female practice patterns. OBJECTIVE: To determine how primary care physician (PCP) compensation by gender differs when applying existing productivity-based and alternative compensation models. DESIGN: Microsimulation. SETTING: 2016 to 2019 national clinical registry of 1222 primary care practices. PARTICIPANTS: Male and female PCPs matched on specialty, years since medical school graduation, practice site, and sessions worked. MEASUREMENTS: Net annual, full-time-equivalent compensation for male versus female PCPs, under productivity-based fee-for-service, panel size-based capitation without or with risk adjustment, and hybrid payment models. Microsimulation inputs included patient and visit characteristics and overhead expenses. RESULTS: Among 1435 matched male (n = 881) and female (n = 554) PCPs, female PCP panels included patients who were, on average, younger, had lower diagnosis-based risk scores, were more often female, and were more often uninsured or insured by Medicaid rather than by Medicare. Under productivity-based payment, female PCPs earned a median of $58 829 (interquartile range [IQR], $39 553 to $120 353; 21%) less than male PCPs. This gap was similar under capitation ($58 723 [IQR, $42 141 to $140 192]). It was larger under capitation risk-adjusted for age alone ($74 695 [IQR, $42 884 to $152 423]), for diagnosis-based scores alone ($114 792 [IQR, $49 080 to $215 326] and $89 974 [IQR, $26 175 to $173 760]), and for age-, sex-, and diagnosis-based scores ($83 438 [IQR, $28 927 to $129 414] and $66 195 [IQR, $11 899 to $96 566]). The gap was smaller and nonsignificant under capitation risk-adjusted for age and sex ($36 631 [IQR, $12 743 to $73 898]). LIMITATION: Panel attribution based on office visits. CONCLUSION: The gender wage gap varied by compensation model, with capitation risk-adjusted for patient age and sex resulting in a smaller gap. Future models might better align with primary care effort and outcomes. PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: None.

Defining a risk-adjustment formula for the introduction of population-based payments for primary care in France.

Novel risk-adjusted payment models for financing primary care are currently being experimented in France. In particular, pilot schemes including shared-savings contracts or prospectively allocated capitation payments are implemented for voluntary primary care structures. Such payment mechanisms require defining a risk-adjustment formula to accurately estimate expected expenditure while maintaining appropriate efficiency incentives. We used nationwide data from the French national health data system (SNDS) to compare the performance of different prospective models for total and outpatient expenditure prediction among more than 8 million individuals aged 65 or more and their application at an aggregate level. We focused on the characterization of morbidity status and on the contextual characteristics to include in the formula. We proposed a set of practical routinely available predictors with fair performance for patient-level expenditure prediction (explaining 32% of variance) that could be used to risk-adjust prospective payments in the French setting. Morbidity information was the strongest predictor but could lead to considerable error in predicted expenditures if introduced as independent binary variables in multiplicative models, underlining the importance of summary morbidity measures and of using the appropriate metric to assess model performance. Distribution of aggregate-level allocations was greatly modified according to the method to account for contextual characteristics. Our work informs the introduction of risk-adjusted models in France and underlines efficiency and fairness issues raised.

Capitated versus fee-for-service reimbursement and quality of care for chronic disease: a US cross-sectional analysis.

BACKGROUND: Upcoming alternative payment models Primary Care First (PCF) and Kidney Care Choices (KCC) incorporate capitated payments for chronic disease management. Prior research on the effect of capitated payments on chronic disease management has shown mixed results. We assessed the patient, physician, and practice characteristics of practices with capitation as the majority of revenue, and evaluated the association of capitated reimbursement with quality of chronic disease care. METHODS: We performed a cross-sectional analysis of visits in the United States' National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for patients with hypertension, diabetes, or chronic kidney disease (CKD). Our predictor was practice reimbursement type, classified as 1) majority capitation, 2) majority FFS, or 3) other reimbursement mix. Outcomes were quality indicators of hypertension control, diabetes control, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker (ACEi/ARB) use, and statin use. RESULTS: About 9% of visits were to practices with majority capitation revenue. Capitated practices, compared with FFS and other practices, had lower visit frequency (3.7 vs. 5.2 vs. 5.2, p = 0.006), were more likely to be located in the West Census Region (55% vs. 18% vs. 17%, p < 0.001), less likely to be solo practice (21% vs. 37% vs. 35%, p = 0.005), more likely to be owned by an insurance company, health plan or HMO (24% vs. 13% vs. 13%, p = 0.033), and more likely to have private insurance (43% vs. 25% vs. 19%, p = 0.004) and managed care payments (69% vs. 23% vs. 26%, p < 0.001) as the majority of revenue. The prevalence of controlled hypertension, controlled diabetes, ACEi/ARB use, and statin use was suboptimal across practice reimbursement types. Capitated reimbursement was not associated with differences in hypertension, diabetes, or CKD quality indicators, in multivariable models adjusting for patient, physician, and practice characteristics. CONCLUSIONS: Practices with majority capitation revenue differed substantially from FFS and other practices in patient, physician, and practice characteristics, but were not associated with consistent quality differences. Our findings establish baseline estimates of chronic disease quality of care performance by practice reimbursement composition, informing chronic disease care delivery within upcoming payment models.

Primary care physician payment mechanisms toward universal health coverage: A study of Iran and selected countries.

BACKGROUND AND AIM: Primary care physician (PCP) payment mechanisms can be important tools for addressing issues of access, quality, and equity in health care. The purpose of the present study is to compare the PCP payment mechanisms of Iran, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Thailand. METHODS: This is a descriptive-comparative study comparing the PCP payment mechanisms of Iran and selected countries in 2020. Data for each country are collected from reliable databases and are tabulated to compare their payment models. Framework analysis is used for data analysis. RESULTS: The results are provided in terms of PCP payment mechanisms, adjusting factor for capitation, reasons for fee-for-service payment, the role of pay-for-performance (PFP) programme, domain and indicators, and reasons for developing PFP in each country. CONCLUSION: The majority of the countries with high UHC service coverage index have applied a mix of PCP payment mechanisms, most of which include capitation and PFP. Moreover, adjusting capitation by factors such as age, sex, and health status will lead to provision of better services to high-risk populations. In recent years, PFP has been paid to Iranian PCPs in addition to salary. Given the various existing models for primary health care in Iran and the increasing burden of chronic diseases, a more appropriate combination of payment mechanisms that create more incentives to provide active and high-quality care should be developed. Also, when developing payment mechanisms, the required infrastructure such as electronic health record should be considered.

Exploring the effects of the withdrawal of the capitation policy on Cesarean rates in public hospitals in Ghana: an interrupted time series analysis

Context and objectives. In Ghana, CS rates have increased by 2% since 2014 even though the World Health Organization has called for the procedure only for medically justifiable cases. Provider payment mechanisms such as capitation have been used to moderate CS rates in some settings. We explored the effects of the withdrawal of the capitation policy on the Cesarean Surgery (CS) rate in public primary care hospitals together with vaginal delivery (VD) and antenatal care for women with 4+ visits (ANC4+) rates. Methods. An interrupted time-series analytical design was used to assess the effects of the withdrawal of capitation on selected variables from the secondary District Health Information Management System (DHIMS 2) of public hospitals between January 2015 and December 2019. Results: The results show that after the policy withdrawal, the trend and level of provision of CS and VD were not significantly altered. Significant declining trends of ANC4+ reversed with significant positive trends after the policy removal. Conclusion. We conclude that the withdrawal of the capitation policy may not have impacted the CS rate significantly in public hospitals. Enhanced capitation payment mechanisms and specific policies aimed at limiting CS are needed to curtail the rise in Ghana.

The effects of Ghana's capitation policy on hospital Under-5 mortality in the Ashanti Region

Objective: The study estimated the capitation policy's effect on the under-5 mortality (U5MR) rate in hospitals in Ashanti Region. Design: We used an interrupted time series design to estimate the impact from secondary data obtained from the DHIMS-2 database. Monthly under-5 deaths and the number of live births per month were extracted and entered into Stata 15.0 for analyses. The U5MR was calculated by dividing the number of live deaths by the number of live births for each of the 60 months of the study. Setting: Health facilities of the Ashanti Region with Data in the DHIMS 2. Intervention: the level and trend of U5MR for 31 months during the Capitation Policy implementation (January 2015 to July 2017) were compared with the level and trend 29 months after the withdrawal of the capitation policy (August 2017 to December 2019). Outcome measures: changes in trend or level of U5MR after the withdrawal of capitation. Main Results: During the capitation policy, monthly U5MR averaged 10.71 +/-2.71 per 1000 live births. It declined to 0.03 deaths per 1000 live births (p=0.65). After the policy withdrawal, the immediate (increase of 0.01 per 1000live births) and the trend (decline of 0.13 deaths per 1000 live births per month) were still not statistically significant. Conclusion: We conclude that the capitation policy did not appear to have influenced under-5 mortality in the Ashanti Region. The design of future healthcare payment models should target quality improvement to reduce under-5 mortalities

Alternative payment models and physician treatment decisions: Evidence from lower back pain.

The capitated payment model has been used to address the high cost of health care. Under capitation, physicians are compensated with a fixed amount per patient, regardless of the services generated. We provide new evidence on how the capitation payment model changes physicians behaviors by studying the treatment of lower back pain, as this type of treatment provides substantial scope for physicians discretion. We use data from 2003 to 2006 from a large database of employer-sponsored health insurance claims and leverage capitation variation within the plan and physician to mitigate selection concerns. The results show that the treatment intensity-primarily derived from therapy and diagnostic testing -of patients under a capitation system is 7-12% lower than that of similar patients in a non-capitated plan. Furthermore, we find no evidence of increased relapse rates for patients in a capitated plan.

Adult capped dental payment model applied within a university setting: an Australian reflective case study.

BACKGROUND: Capitation models of care in dentistry started around 1973 with varying degrees of success in meeting the needs of the individuals and expectations of the participating private practitioners. These studies mostly identified that capitation payments resulted in under treatment whilst fee-for-service models often led to over treatment. The objective of this study was to develop a new way of doing business using an outsourcing capitation model of care to meet population health needs and activity-based funding requirements of rural Local Health Districts with a local university dental school. This payment model is an alternate referral pathway for public oral health practitioners from the existing New South Wales Oral Health Fee-for-Service Scheme that focuses on urgent treatment to one that offers an all-inclusive preventive approach that concentrates on sustaining good long-term oral health for the individual. METHOD: The reflective study analysed various adult age cohorts (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and 75 + years) based on 950 participants randomly selected from the Greater Southern adult public dental waiting lists. The study's capitation formula was derived from NSW government adult treatment items (n = 447,625). Dental care was provided through the local university's dental clinics utilising only dental students under clinical supervision. All data were sourced from NSW Oral Health Data Warehouse during 1 January 2012-30 June 2018 and analysed by using SAS 9.3 and Version 13 Microsoft Excel. RESULTS: There were 10,305 dental care items and 1129 capitation courses of care totalling A$599,026. This resulted in an average of 11 dental care items being provided to each participant. The capitation payment formula utilising the most provided dental care items of 100 individual patients proved to be economical and preventive focused. CONCLUSION: The systematic reflection showed that this unique methodology in developing an adult capitation payment formula associated to diagnostic pathways that resulted in: (i) more efficient usage of government expenditure on public dental services, (ii) provision of person-centred courses of dental care, and (iii) utilisation of university dental education programs to best practice treatment and holistic care.

Twelve years with a capitation payment system in Swedish dental care: longitudinal development of oral health.

BACKGROUND: Since 2007, patients receiving oral health care within the Public Dental Service in Sweden have had the possibility to choose between the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payment system or the new capitation payment system, 'Dental Care for Health' (DCH). Payment models are believed to involve different incentive structures for patients and caregivers. In theory, different incentives may lead to differences in health-related outcomes, and the research has been inconclusive. This 12-year longitudinal prospective cohort study of patients in regular dental care analyzes oral health development and self-reported oral health in relation to the patients' level of education in the two payment systems, and compares with the results from an earlier 6-year follow-up. METHODS: Information was obtained through a questionnaire and from a register from n = 5877 individuals who kept their original choice of payment model for 12 years, 1650 patients in DCH and 4227 in FFS, in the Public Dental Service in Region Västra Götaland, Sweden. The data comprised manifest caries prevalence, levels of self-reported oral health and education, and choice of dental care payment model. Analyses were performed with chi square and multivariable regression analysis. RESULTS: The findings from the 6-year follow-up were essentially maintained at the 12-year examination, showing that the pre-baseline caries prevalence is the most influential factor for less favorable oral health development in terms of the resulting caries prevalence. Educational level (≥ university) showed an increased influence on the risk of higher caries prevalence after 12 years and differed between payment models with regard to the relation to self-rated oral health. CONCLUSIONS: Differences in health and health-influencing properties between payment models were sustained from 6 to 12 years. Strategies for making use of potential compensatory mechanisms within the capitation payment system to increase oral health equality should be considered.

Achieving better value in pediatric care: school systems as clinical and financial partners?

This article argues that value-based health systems may contract with school districts engaged in capitated special education to achieve better patient outcomes and lower costs for the pediatric population.

Money matters - primary care providers' perceptions of payment incentives.

PURPOSE: Payments to healthcare providers create incentives that can influence provider behaviour. Research on unit-level incentives in primary care is, however, scarce. This paper examines how managers and salaried physicians at Swedish primary healthcare centres perceive that payment incentives directed towards the healthcare centre affect their work. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: An interview study was conducted with 24 respondents at 13 primary healthcare centres in two cities, located in regions with different payment systems. One had a mixed system comprised of fee-for-service and risk-adjusted capitation payments, and the other a mainly risk-adjusted capitation system. FINDINGS: Findings suggested that both managers and salaried physicians were aware of and adapted to unit-level payment incentives, albeit the latter sometimes to a lesser extent. Respondents perceived fee-for-service payments to stimulate production of shorter visits, up-coding of visits and skimming of healthier patients. Results also suggested that differentiated rates for patient visits affected horizontal prioritisations between physician and nurse visits. Respondents perceived that risk-adjustments for diagnoses led to a focus on registering diagnosis codes, and to some extent, also up-coding of secondary diagnoses. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: Policymakers and responsible authorities need to design payment systems carefully, balancing different incentives and considering how and from where data used to calculate payments are retrieved, not relying too heavily on data supplied by providers. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: This study contributes evidence on unit-level payment incentives in primary care, a scarcely researched topic, especially using qualitative methods.

Effects of removing a fee-for-service incentive on specialist chronic disease services: a time-series analysis. / Effets de la suppression des mesures incitatives s'ajoutant à la rémunération à l'acte sur les services spécialisés liés aux maladies chroniques : une analyse des séries chronologiques.

INTRODUCTION: Physician payment models are known to affect the nature and volume of services provided. Our objective was to study the effects of removing a financial incentive, the fee-for-service premium, on the provision of chronic disease follow-up services by internal medicine, cardiology, nephrology and gastroenterology specialists. METHODS: We collected linked administrative health care data for the period 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2017 from databases held at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES) in Ontario, Canada. We conducted a time-series analysis before and after the removal of the fee-for-service premium on 1 April 2015. The primary outcome was total monthly visits for chronic disease follow-up services. Secondary outcomes were monthly visits for total follow-up services and new patient consultations. We compared internal medicine, cardiology, nephrology and gastroenterology specialists practising during the study timeframe with respirology, hematology, endocrinology, rheumatology and infectious diseases specialists who remained eligible to claim the premium. We chose this comparison group as these are all subspecialties of internal medicine, providing similar services. RESULTS: The number of chronic disease follow-up visits decreased significantly after removal of the premium, but there was no decrease in total follow-up visits. There was also a significant downward trend in new patient consultations. No changes were observed in the comparison group. CONCLUSION: The decrease in volume of chronic disease follow-up visits can be explained by diagnostic criteria being met less often, rather than an actual reduction in services provided. Potential effects on patient outcomes require further exploration.